+ Slide 20

Part of a talk delivered to the ITU Workshop on ... issues in E-Government, June 6, 2003, Geneva
by Douglas W. Jones
THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA Department of Computer Science


Voting Systems

Risk Assessment


Crooks will eventually find the weaknesses of whatever system we use.

Smart crooks do not attack new voting systems
    They wait until the public accept and trust the system


Different voting systems have different vulnerabilities

    Paper ballots, optical mark-sense, punched cards:
        adding ballots to the box
        theft of ballots or ballot boxes
            precinct-level fraud
            county-level fraud

    Mechanical voting machines:
        technicians can selectively break counters
            county-level fraud

    Direct recording electronic voting systems:
        technicians can selectively change code
            county-level fraud
        programmers can add corrupt software
            state-level fraud
            national-level fraud


In short:

    Old technology is good for retail fraud

    New technology may enable wholsale fraud