+ Slide 37

Part of a talk delivered at Cornell College, Jan 8, 2004
by Douglas W. Jones
THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA Department of Computer Science


Who Must We Trust Today


The administrative rules of each state extend trust in different ways

In Georgia, a state with fairly well thought-out rules,

* Public oversight of polling place closing is not guaranteed
  although the election worker handbook corrects
  this oversight in the rules themselves.

* Neither public oversight nor bipartisan monitoring are
  apply to pre-election access to the voting hardware by the
  polling place supervisor in the days before the election.

The machine itself may be dishonest

Today, voting system software is subject to audit, but:

* Public questioning of the auditors is not permitted

* Public examination of the audit reports is not permitted

The audit process has failed!

* the Hopkins Report, confirmed by SAIC and Compuware,
  showed that Diebold's software was grossly insecure,
  yet the official audit report said it was the best voting
  system software the auditors had ever seen.

  Diebold knew about some of these flaws 5 years ago!

* In Georgia's voting machine tesing lab, Rob Behler said
  that he downloaded voting machine software patches from
  a public FTP server using an insecure laptop.

* In California, a recent audit showed that no Diebold voting
  system was running only the unauthorized software.