

CS:4980

Foundations of Embedded Systems

Safety Requirements

Part II


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
Requirements-based Design

- ❑ Systematic approach to design of systems
- ❑ Given:
 - Input/output interface of system/component C to be designed
 - Model E of the environment
 - Safety properties P_1, \dots, P_n of the composite system
- ❑ Design problem:
 - Fill in details of C (state variables, initialization, and update) so that P_1, \dots, P_n are invariant for $C \parallel E$

Railroad Controller Example




Train Model



- ❑ Each train is initially away from bridge
- ❑ Train can be in **away** state for an arbitrarily long period
- ❑ When the train gets close, it communicates with the traffic controller via an event, say, **arrive**, and now it is in a different state, say, **wait**
- ❑ When near, train is monitoring the signal on the bridge:
 - If the signal is **green**, it enters the bridge
 - If the signal is **red**, it continues to wait
- ❑ A train can stay on bridge for a duration that is not exactly known (and not directly under the control of the traffic controller)
- ❑ When the train leaves the bridge, it communicates with the controller via an event, say, **leave**, and goes back to **away** state
- ❑ This behavior repeats: an away train may again request entry
- ❑ The two trains have symmetric behavior


Controller Design Problem




Safety Requirement: Trains should not be on bridge simultaneously
Formally, the following should be an **invariant**:

$$\sim(\text{mode}_W = \text{bridge} \ \& \ \text{mode}_E = \text{bridge})$$

Synchronous Component Train




First Attempt at Controller Design



- ❑ Controller maintains state variables **east**, **west** to track the state of each signal
- ❑ Both state variables are initially **green**
- ❑ Set the output for the signals is based on the corresponding state vars
- ❑ If a train arrives, then update the opposite signal var to **red** to block the other train from entering the bridge
- ❑ If a train leaves, reset the opposite signal var to **green**
- ❑ What happens if both trains arrive simultaneously?
Give priority to east train: set **west** signal var to **red**

Synchronous Component Controller1



Controller

west

green



red



red



green



red



red

red

red

green

red

east

green



green



green



green



green



green

green

green

Train W

mode_W

away



wait



wait



wait



bridge



bridge

arrive!

Train E

mode_E

away



wait



bridge



away



wait



bridge

arrive!

leave!


arrive!



Second Attempt at Controller Design

- ❑ What went wrong the first time? Controller did not remember whether a train was waiting at each entrance
- ❑ Boolean variable $near_w$ remembers whether the west train wants to use the bridge
 - Initially 0
 - When the west train issues $arrive$, changed to 1
 - When the west train issues $leave$, reset back to 0
- ❑ Invariant: $mode_w = away \iff near_w = 0$
- ❑ Variable $near_e$ is symmetric
- ❑ Let's also start with both signals red
- ❑ A signal is changed to $green$ if the corresponding train is near and the other signal is red ; it is changed back to red when train is away
- ❑ Need still to resolve simultaneous arrivals by preferring one train

Second Attempt at Controller Design



Properties of Controller2

- ❑ The system $\text{RailRoadSystem2} = \text{Controller2} \parallel \text{Train}_W \parallel \text{Train}_E$ satisfies the safety property


$$\sim(\text{mode}_W = \text{bridge} \ \& \ \text{mode}_E = \text{bridge})$$

- ❑ What about some additional properties?
 1. If the west train is waiting then west signal will eventually become green
 2. If the west train is waiting for its signal to turn green, other train should not be allowed on bridge more than once
- ❑ Requirement 1 is a **liveness** requirement (see Chap. 4 of text)
- ❑ Requirement 2 is a **safety** requirement
 - Its violation can demonstrated by a (finite) execution in which east train enters, leaves, and enters again while west train keeps waiting with its signal red
 - But it cannot be encoded as an invariant on system state variables!


Safety Monitor

- ❑ Monitor M for a system observes its inputs/outputs, and enters an error state if undesirable behavior is detected
- ❑ Monitor M is specified as extended state machine
 1. The set of input variables of M = input/output variables of system being monitored
 2. An output of M cannot be an input to system (monitor does not influence what the system does)
 3. A subset F of modes of state-machine declared as accepting
- ❑ Undesirable behavior: An execution that leads monitor state to F
- ❑ Safety verification: Check whether ($M.mode$ not in F) is an invariant of system $C \parallel M$

Safety Monitors



Monitor to check fairness for railroad



Error execution:

As west train waits, east train is allowed on bridge twice

Exercise: Leader Election

- ❑ Suppose we want to check that at most one of the nodes declares itself to be the leader
- ❑ Design a monitor M
 - Input variables: $\{\text{undecided}, \text{leader}, \text{follower}\} \text{ status}_n$, for each node n
 - M should enter error state **iff** for two distinct nodes m and n
 1. there exists a round r_1 in which $\text{status}_m = \text{leader}$ and
 2. there exists a round r_2 in which $\text{status}_n = \text{leader}$
- ❑ Consider the requirement: eventually $\text{status}_n \neq \text{undecided}$

Why can't we design a monitor that enters an error state if this requirement is violated?

Credits

Notes based on Chapter 3 of

Principles of Cyber-Physical Systems

by Rajeev Alur
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